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Beth Kewell, University of Surrey, Surrey, UK. 
Richard Adams, University of Surrey, Surrey, UK. 
Glenn Parry, University of the West of England, UK.  
 
Explores key areas of Blockchain innovation that appear to represent viable 
catalysts for achieving global Sustainable Development targets. 
 
Projects and initiatives seeking to extend the reach of Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLTs), seem mostly intended for the benefit of for-profit businesses, 
governments, and consumers.  
DLT projects, devised for the public good, could aim, in theory, to fulfil the 
United Nation’s current Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). 
Our overview of these initiatives suggests that blockchain technology is being 
applied in ways that could transform this ambition for good into a practical reality. 
 
Current examples of blockchain deployment are being specified within a value-creation 
remit that is most likely to benefit for-profit businesses, governments, and consumers 
(Ng, 2013; Bohme et al., 2015; Swan, 2015; Potts et al., 2016; McWaters et al., 2016; 
Walport, 2016). Received ideas about what blockchain can and should be used for are 
based on perceptions that the key role of this technology is to unlock cost savings and 
secure efficiency gains, whilst also enabling widespread business model transformation 
(Walport, 2016). Within this scenario, blockchain affordances (Gibson, 1978) are 
principally seen to ‘do good’ by resolving longstanding obstacles to profitability and 
value-capture (Walport, 2016).  
 
The aim of this paper is to consider how blockchain solutions could be used to achieve 
good outcomes for the sustainable development agenda by, for example, helping to 
fulfil the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015). Kranzberg’s first law of 
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technology avers that ‘Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral’ 
(Kranzberg’s, 1986, p.545). In doing so, Kranzberg reminds us that innovations are 
morally and ethically instantiated. To date, research has tended to focus on the technical 
characteristics, efficiency gains - and  profits - to be yielded from blockchain projects 
and experimental Distributed Ledger Technology (DLTs) and ‘permissioned ledgers’ 
being run by private consortia (Ng, 2013; Bohme et al., 2015; Swan, 2015; Potts et al., 
2016; McWaters et al., 2016; Walport, 2016).  While initially fixed on the commercial 
and consumer benefits to be drawn from blockchain innovation, attention is beginning 
to shift toward the appropriation of socially and environmentally beneficial use cases 
that aim to tackle global challenges such as, for example, financial exclusion (CTPM, 
2016). 
 
Drawing on affordance theory, this exploratory paper reflects on innovative applications 
of blockchain projects that could help deliver socially and environmentally beneficial 
outcomes by challenging existing business models and providing new opportunities for 
value creation that also serve a philanthropic purpose (Botsman and Rogers, 2010). We 
call this ‘Blockchain for Good’, where ‘Good’ can be framed in terms of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (UN, 2015). The SDGs provide a vision for 
governmental, corporate and civic action leading the way towards ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987, para 27).  
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The paper proceeds as follows: First, we describe our approach to this exploratory 
research. Second, we offer a brief overview of the technological characteristics of DLT. 
Third, we examine the notion that DLTs have unique affordances rendering them 
appropriate solutions to the SDGs. Consequently, in this article we begin to explore the 
impact of DLTs on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals which is the contribution 
of the paper. 
 
Affordances 
The repositioning of blockchain technologies as a device for mobilising good causes, 
including those positioned at a global level, represents a considerable departure from 
their original remit as payments reconciliation systems which may be utilised without 
the need for banks and clearing houses (Ng, 2013; Bohme et al., 2015; Swan, 2015; 
Welch, 2015; Potts et al., 2016; McWaters et al., 2016; Walport, 2016). The 
identification of such an important ‘change of use’ draws attention to a concomitant 
shift in perceptions of blockchain affordances – that is to say, discernment of what the 
software  can do for sustainable development and environmental protection in parallel 
with an appreciation of what novel deployment could realise for vulnerable and 
impoverished communities (Seidel et al. 2013). Key organisations, such as the UN, are 
actively focused on establishing blockchain’s capacity for achieving SDGs in, for 
example, identity provision and financial inclusion (CTPM, 2016).  
 
Scoping exercises, focused on pinpointing blockchain’s potential contribution to the 
sustainability field may represent a first step towards developing a future ‘affordance 
taxonomy’ (Conole and Dyke, 2004) to guide the deployment of blockchain-for-good in 
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the third sector and among social enterprises, including those already taking advantage 
of crowd-funding and other charitable activities made possible by virtual platforms 
(Choy and Schlagwein, 2016).     
 
Affordances are bestowed upon artefacts – they are the qualities users perceive objects, 
places, contexts, and constructs, uphold and encompass (Gaver, 1991; Zammuto et al., 
2007; Maier and Fadel, 2009; Faraj et al., 2011; Withagen, 2012; Majchrzak and 
Markus, 2012; Xenakis and Arnellos, 2013; Lankton et al., 2015; Ciavola and 
Gershenson, 2016; Choy and Schlagwein, 2016; Beynon-Davies and Lederman, 2017). 
Affordances are bound to expectations of what artefacts can be/can do and thus 
reputational information (Kewell, 2007) that tells us whether the actions they ought to 
assist Ciavola and Gershenson (2016, p.252) or facilitate are worthwhile, valuable, risky 
or unwise (Zammuto et al., 2007). Affordances can therefore be seen to possess an 
implicit moral imperative (Dierksmeier and Seele, 2016). 
 
Artefacts by themselves have no power; they do nothing (Geels, 2005). Affordance 
theory suggests that an artefact is fundamentally perceived in terms of its ‘action 
possibilities’ (Withagen, 2012, p.521). Drawing on Gibson’s (1978) work on the 
ecology of perception, Pea (1993, p. 51) describes an ‘affordance’ as the perceived and 
actual properties of a thing, primarily those functional properties that determine just 
how the thing could possibly be used. An affordance, then, is what an object or 
technology offers, provides or furnishes in the context of use: depending on the user, a 
chair ‘affords’ sitting or an improvised ladder (Maier and Fadel, 2009); a bicycle 
‘affords’ travel, or exercise or the delivery of health benefits (Conole and Dyke, 2004; 
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Maier and Fadel, 2009; Volkoff and Strong, 2013; Lankton et al., 2015; Ciavola and 
Gershenson, 2016).  
 
Affordance theory subsequently delineates between intended uses built into the design 
process and consequential affordances, which avail themselves as prototypes are tested, 
and end-products are evaluated by potential users and consumers leading to the 
development of ‘sequential’ and ‘nested’ affordances (Gaver, 1991, p.4). Original 
construals of affordance can change markedly by the end of this learning curve (Gaver, 
1991). Dual affordances can also emerge over time, once an artefact, prototype or 
design has acquired up-take (Beynon-Davies and Lederman, 2017). Thus, the recycling 
movement has also recently shown how the original meaning of an artefact’s 
affordances can be usurped or overturned by, for example, making objects with 
established or traditional affordance perform tasks for which they were not originally 
intended. A good illustration of the latter is provided by the current trend in urban cities 
for ‘container living,’ whereby redundant sea freight containers are converted into 
sustainable homes.  
 
A relatively new area of  technological affordance theory examines the development of 
simulated computer technologies and the impact perceptions of what they can do has on 
human and organizational relations in the ‘real world’ (Zammuto et al., 2007; Boyd, 
2010; Faraj et al., 2011). The affordances of software products can be altered by 
multiple designers and mass users (Boyd, 2010, p.7). By itself, this capacity rewrites 
existing conceptions of the interaction between designers, users, artefacts, and the 
environment in which they are embedded (Zammuto et al., 2007; Faraj et al., 2011; 
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Ciavola and Gershenson, 2016). When positioned within social networks (Boyd, 2010), 
the affordances of simulated technology (such as platforms and blockchains) are 
percieved to foster new forms of communitarian action and social exchange (Faraj et 
al., 2011; Choy and Schlagwein, 2016). When considered within an organisational 
context, these technologies are said to change perceptions of what may be afforded by 
systems, structures and processes, for example, those illustrated in workflow 
visualisation software (Beynon-Davies and Lederman, 2017), allowing previously 
hidden sources of value to become more self-evident (Zammuto et al., 2007; Faraj, et 
al., 2011; Ciavola and Gershenson, 2016).  
 
The discovery of affordances related to blockchain technology is following patterns 
identified within inter and intraorganisational contexts. Blockchain is part of a thriving 
ecosystem, populated, en masse, by designers and users, who are continually 
improvising new affordances, as they tweak the technology for use in different settings. 
The advent of usecases for intraorganizational and consortia based blockchain 
deployment (as DLTs and permissioned ledgers), suggests that it will not be very long 
before companies begin to perceive blockchains as instruments of change. In what 
follows, we consider how perceptions of blockchain affordances are likely to change 
understandings of what can be achieved in the sustainable development field, as an 
ecosystem that must address mutiple requirements (from disaster relief to 
microfinance), using extremely complex networks of interactions. Could these 
interactions be placed on blockchains? Could this placement deliver better outcomes for 
aspects of society and the environment that are most in need and generate new sources 
of good? 
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Affordances for good 
It is important to consider what we mean by good before addressing these questions. 
The western philosophical tradition has, for millennia, distinguished between intrinsic 
and extrinsic good (Smith, 1948) the former, good for its own sake, the latter being 
derivatives of the former – that is, an extrinsic good is good not for its own sake, but 
because its enactment leads back to an intrinsic good. The debates about the ontological 
status of intrinsic and extrinsic good, what constitutes them, the sorts of things that are 
or have intrinsic or extrinsic good(ness) and how these might be assessed or computed 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Frankena (1973) provides a comprehensive list of 
those things which are intrinsically good – as deemed by other authors to be good or 
rational to desire for their own sakes. Others, for example George Moore (1903), reject 
the notion of intrinsic good and take a more consequentialist view that things are good 
when they are perceived to be good, where their consequences are in some sense better 
than those of alternatives. 
 
There is a substantial literature on ethical issues surrounding ICTs, much of it framed 
around what constitutes ‘better’ and how that might be evaluated, including: the impact 
of technological progress on society (Lee, 2005) and the influence of technology on the 
development of virtuous interactions (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006). Arguing that 
ICT’s beneficial impact can be evaluated by distinguishing between local and systemic 
levels, the difference between content and process, the implication of Taddeo and 
Vaccaro’s (2011) framing is that an ethical understanding of technologies can be gained 
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through an interrogation of how the ways in which they work enable new beneficial 
actions and outcomes.  
 
In ascribing a DLT initiative as being good, we are undertaking an evaluation. Value is 
said to be the measure of goodness (Ng, 2013) and pragmatically we seek to make a 
judgment of what is good in our case. Our evaluation of DLTs is not based on 
judgement of an intrinsic or extrinsic goodness. Rather the judgement is based on the 
decisions made by the people who invent, develop, distribute and use them (Argandoña, 
2003) in relation to the consequences of those technologies for the UN’s 17 SDGs and 
169 targets which, on September 25th, 2015 the 193 Member States of the United 
Nations unanimously adopted. 
 
DLTs have, in some quarters, received an unfavourable press largely grounded in the 
observation that the DLT enabled cryptocurrencies – notably Bitcoin –have been 
associated with illicit and illegal activities such as drug dealing and arms trading (it 
should be said, a critique that applies equally to cash). Leading financial institutions and 
banking consortia are currently looking for ways to create their own permissioned or 
private cryptocurrency ecosystems, (as seen in the example of the ‘r3’ consortium2). 
Blockchain use cases focus, typically, on mapping the affordances DLTs might convey 
within largescale finance services (European Central Bank, 2012; Ali et al., 2014; 
McWaters et al., 2016).With little consensus about the potential impact of DLTs for 
good or ill, it is clear that the subject requires serious analysis. To focus on a single 
application or specific usage of the technology is to overlook its possible significance 
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for ethical impacts at a global level. To ensure that the opportunities for ethical action 
potentially engrained in new technologies such as DLTs may be realized, it is important 
that the wider significance of the so-called ‘Blockchain for Good’ (B4G) is understood. 
 
The blockchain first appeared, largely unheralded, in 2008. Attention, instead, was 
directed toward the application whose existence blockchain technology made possible. 
The focal application and the first to run on a blockchain was the crypto-currency 
Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008; Lemieux, 2013).  
 
The significance of the underlying DLT is that it enables the digital transfer of value 
between two unknown entities without the need for a trusted third party. Simply put, 
DLT allows anyone to transact with anyone anywhere on a P2P basis. DLTs enhance 
the transparency of information exchanges (including payments and deposits), making 
trust obligations much easier to discharge between transacting parties. The service of 
value transfer is normally provided by intermediaries such as banks. DLT reallocates 
the responsibilities of transfer management to computers and algorithms (Ali et al., 
2014; Welch, 2015; McWaters et al., 2016). Because of the way in which the 
technology is configured to allow P2P digital exchange of value, the blockchain, to 
many observers, represents a revolutionary and disruptive innovation (Swan, 2015; 
Zuberi and Levin, 2016). 
 
Fundamentally, a blockchain is a ledger of transactions of digital assets: of who owns 
what, who transacts what, of what is transacted and when. Transactions are not recorded 
on a single database but distributed on the computers of the network of users (nodes) of 
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the system. No single entity owns or controls the ledger, and so network members can 
view the recorded transactions. Transactions are recorded and stored in ‘blocks,’ and 
each block linked chronologically (hence chain) and cryptographically to those which 
precede it to create an immutable, tamper-resistant record. All transactions are time-
stamped to provide a record of when transactions occurred and in what order: this 
assures against ‘double spending’ and tampering with previous transaction records 
(Reber and Feuerstein, 2014). The ledger is ‘kept honest’ by network consensus, a 
transaction validation process undertaken by network users, which includes checking 
that digital signatures are correct through a process known as ‘mining’: mining is 
incentivised by reward systems. Once a block is accepted by the network and added to 
the chain, it cannot be changed: it is a permanent, transparent and immutable record. 
 
Consequently, DLTs may be characterised as globally distributed, P2P, open ledgers of 
exchange providing an immutable and verifiable record and encrypting the identities of 
users that is hard to tamper with.  Davidson et al. (2016) describe DLTs as a new 
general purpose technology which are, by definition, highly pervasive and can impact 
entire economies giving rise to creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934; Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2005) with the potential to disrupt any centralized system that coordinates 
valuable information (Wright and De Filippi, 2015).  
 
DLTs represent a fundamental change in the way in which humans can exchange value, 
and two important implications follow. First, because the technology provides the 
required trust to give peers the confidence to exchange value directly, the requirement 
for socially-constructed institutional third-party providers of trust is significantly 
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reduced: they become disintermediated. The second implication is that the blockchain 
presages a new functionality for the internet: it moves from an internet of information to 
an internet of value (Swan, 2015). It means, that for objects that can be expressed in 
code, multiple novel application possibilities are opened up, and raises the question, 
how can blockchain technology that creates immutable, tamper-resistant distributed 
records of transactions of digital assets be applied in the service of SDGs? 
 
Mattila (2016) points out that the technology stack components of DLTs is diverse and 
can be configured in a variety of ways, resulting in different DLT architectures, 
implying the need for design decisions. Blockchains can be categorized as, for example, 
Permissioned/Permissionless and Specific Purpose Blockchains optimized for the 
management of assets and General Purpose Blockchains designed to allow users to 
write their own programmes to be stored on the blockchain and automatically executed 
in a distributed manner. Notwithstanding these divergences, DLTs share certain 
characteristics which may be more or less attenuated depending on the context of the 
application, in particular: the distributed (decentralized) consensus mechanism, 
immutability, algorithmic trust, resilience against manipulation, and secure information 
sharing.  
 
Nakamoto’s (2008) white paper describes what might be considered to be a pure form 
of DLT, that is to say a permissionless blockchain encompassing a network of 
participants that are not known to one another and each of them can access the 
blockchain with complete freedom to read or write to it, no actor can prevent any other 
actor from contributing content nor can any actor remove any previously validated 
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contribution; and consensus is incentivised through economic mechanisms. 
Permissionless Blockchains are therefore highly censorship resistant and can provide an 
immutable
3
, network-validated global record of transaction histories – right up to the 
present moment.  
 
On the other hand, anyone
4
 may have a copy of the ledger in a permissioned blockchain, 
but only certain authorised parties may write to it and the consensus process is 
determined by the owner(s) of that blockchain, usually carried out by trusted actors in 
the network (CPTM, 2016). Assuming that chosen actors honestly and disinterestedly 
validate transactions, then permissioned blockchains can offer certain advantages, in at 
least two respects: first, they can be designed with specific functionality in mind and, 
second, alternatives to economically-incentivized validation mechanisms (proof-of-
work) can be incorporated. As a result, permissioned blockchains can be more efficient 
and faster than unpermissioned versions (CPTM, 2016) but at the cost of reduced 
security, immutability and censorship-resistance (Mattila, 2016). 
 
A sub-category of the permissioned blockchain is the private blockchain in which only 
certain authorised users have access to the database, whether for reading or writing, 
which tend to exist behind some organizational firewall but offer within-group 
transparency, privacy, and control, for a defined set of users. Whether or not they truly 
are DLTs continues to be debated, but the permissioned blockchain does have a role in 
helping deliver the SDG agenda. In the following, we explore some of these further and 
consider their affordance in terms of the SDGs. 
                                                          
3
 Immutable to the extent that that particular blockchain continues to be maintained. It is not clear what 
happens in the circumstance that a particular blockchain ceases to be maintained by a network. 
4
 Anyone, subject to, of course, the nature of the permissions. 
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Blockchain mining  
In the Bitcoin blockchain, transactions are validated by network members (nodes) in a 
process known as mining. This distributed, network-member-driven process, performs 
the function of the centralized trusted third party intermediary model. Network 
participants compete with each other using computer power (known as proof-of-work) 
to validate blocks of transactions every 10 minutes or so. The proof-of-work is difficult 
to produce but easy for other nodes to verify and so transaction validity is established by 
majority consensus of network members. The miner that first successfully validates a 
block is rewarded with newly minted Bitcoins
5
. 
 
That network members commit resources to validating transactions, which in turn 
contributes to the cryptographic security and fraud resilience of the Bitcoin blockchain. 
The network is configured in such a way that it makes more sense for would-be 
attackers to participate as miners (greater opportunity for reward at lesser cost), thus 
increasing the resilience of the blockchain (Doguet, 2013; Fox-Brewster, 2015; Welch, 
2015). 
 
However, the computationally intensive method of proof-of-work has been described as 
costly and wasteful (McWaters et al., 2016). As miners around the world competitively 
dedicate resources to validate transactions, Aste (2016) estimates about a billion Watts 
of electricity are consumed globally every second to produce a valid proof of work for 
Bitcoin. In light of this, alternative validation mechanisms are being investigated, some 
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of which resonate with the SDG agenda but also relax some of the communitarian 
properties of the proof-of-work approach (such as openness to the whole community).  
 
Dierksmeier and Seele (2016) argue that it should be possible to promote ethical goals 
in society, by for example, hitching the ‘mining’ to the creation of ecological or social 
benefits. Certainly, reducing energy consumption in the process would ameliorate 
ecological harms and a small number of initiatives have emerged in this area. 
SolarCoin
6
, for example, rewards generators of solar energy with new coin; another, 
GridCoin (Halford, 2014) introduces a novel algorithm based on work done in BOINC 
(Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) projects: miners are 
incentivized to participate in scientific projects (as in healthcare and space exploration) 
aiming to provide benefit to humanity. In the CureCoin blockchain, the Bitcoin 
validation calculations are replaced by (useful) protein folding tasks: mining CureCoin 
helps science through simulating protein behaviour and providing these data to research 
scientists. 
 
The internet of value(s) 
The previous section describes how social or ecological benefit can be linked to the 
production of alt-currencies. This section focuses on how these benefits can be related 
to currency use. The notion of coloured coins (Bradbury, 2013) is used to denote a 
small part of a coin with specific attributes which may represent anything from physical 
assets to a community’s values. By moving coloured coins through the network, asset 
ownership can be securely transferred. Similarly, coins coloured with values, in which 
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morals, principles or ethics are embedded in the code, can allow individuals to align 
their spending closely with their values. 
 
Taghiyeva et al. (2016) describe a proof-of-concept pilot for a blockchain-based Islamic 
crypto-currency in which transactions and Muslim values, including a blended anti-
radicalisation agenda, are aligned: a currency with a community’s desirable social 
principles engineered-in. This resonates with Helbing’s (2013, 2014) concept of 
Qualified Money where values can be embedded in DLTs. CarbonCoin
7
 claims to be the 
first digital currency with a conscience, designed to engage the environmentally 
conscious community. Such possibilities raise important questions about whose values 
are embedded into a currency and who does the engineering.  
 
In terms of assets, DLTs provide a mechanism both for their registration and transfer. A 
number of commentators have argued that this may prove a boon in developing or 
politically unstable economies for the registration of individual’s property rights. Where 
there is a lack of trust in central authorities to maintain uncorrupted registers of assets, 
such as property title, these may be recorded immutably, transparently, and verifiably 
on a blockchain. A number of pilots and trial projects are underway: Bitland
8
 use DLT 
to map land title in Ghana providing a registry of ownership which subsequently 
facilitates the mobilization of capital as well as a transparent property market. Similar 
initiatives can be found in Honduras (Alejandro, 2016), Sweden (Rizzo, 2016) and 
Georgia (Shin, 2016). Progress has been slow and success mixed (ODI, 2016), attesting 
to the still emergent nature of the technology. Indeed, it is too easy to get carried away 
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Blockchain for Good 
 
Page 16 of 32 
 
by the theoretical potential of DLTs. While a blockchain based registry of assets may be 
transparent and immutable, for it to be meaningful in terms of economic participation 
and activity it must exist within a stable infrastructure: armed aggressors, for example, 
may still unlawfully seize property regardless of whether or not it is recorded on the 
blockchain. However, the existence and immutability of the record may act as a 
deterrent against such behaviour. 
 
Supply chains 
Assets can be registered to the blockchain using unique keys. This provides a register of 
ownership as well as tracking and pattern of ownership over time. Initiatives that have 
leveraged this affordance include Everledger
9
, a permanent ledger for diamond 
certification and related transaction history transparently recording ownership history 
and reducing crime, and Provenance
10
 who provide a system for tracking materials and 
products in a manner that is public, secure and inclusive. For the SDGs, this means that 
claims (albeit excluding those blood diamonds or sustainably fished tuna) can be 
demonstrated to be authentic right through the supply chain, shifting the value system 
towards origin and provenance (Greenspan, 2015).  
 
DLT applications are also being explored in the energy market both as a system 
enabling  individuals to sell excess solar-generated electricity to each other without 
going through third parties (such as PowerLedger
11
  and TransActive
12
) as well as 
developing a market infrastructure for carbon trading, an independent ledger of the 
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11
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12
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permits to emit Earth’s allowance of greenhouse gases (Casalotti, 2016). One scenario 
is that, within a short time, every individual on the planet, for example, be issued with 
an annual carbon allocation that may be traced via the DLT network. 
 
Innovations in governance 
Within the DLT code substitutes for trust and allows for new types of commerce. 
Appropriately designed, these can be the building blocks of new forms of economic and 
social governance that meet the objectives of the SDGs. 
 
Smart contracts are computer protocols that facilitate, verify and enforce the 
performance of a contract: self-executing code. They are the automation of the 
performance of contracts which only execute when pre-specified conditions are met, 
thus removing the need for third party resolution. This is an assured and low-cost 
mechanism that can offer for Bottom of the Pyramid economic actors increased speed, 
efficiency, and trust that the contract will be executed as agreed, thus enabling arm’s 
length transactions and payments triggered on receipt of goods. A further application is 
in the realm of providing more secure and inclusive voting and elections. The danger, of 
course, is that the contract performs no matter what: this raises questions about who 
writes them (Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?), how to write-in flexibility to respond to 
and incorporate external events, and individual’s free will in connecting with them.  
 
It is a small step from smart contracts to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations 
(DAOs) which are similarly executed by code but, unlike smart contracts, may include a 
potentially unlimited number of participants (Buterin, 2014). DAOs remain largely 
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untested and use cases relating to SDGs are hard to find: nevertheless, indicative of the 
infancy of the technology, one major DAO initiative fell victim to misappropriation of 
approximately $80m (Price, 2016), indicating the need for further developmental work. 
One area where the concept has been developed is in the creation of DLT mediated 
organisations made of people but where the governance structure is encoded directly 
into the technical infrastructure stipulating and enabling the rules and procedures of the 
organisation that every member of the organisation will have to abide by such design 
propositions may help to eliminate fraud and corruption. 
 
Sharing economy 
The sharing economy has been heralded as one solution to the challenges of 
sustainability by promoting environmentally sensitive forms of consumption, 
encouraging different models of ownership and addressing issues such as the under-
utilisation of assets. However, some scholars recognise a Dark Side (Malhotra and Van 
Alstyne, 2014), partly for its tendency to reinforce the contemporary unsustainable 
economic paradigm (Martin, 2016),  partly because some providers’ business models 
are argued to be as much about evading regulations as about sharing, partly for 
spreading precarity throughout the workforce, for middlemen sucking profits out of 
previously un-monetized interactions (Scholz, 2016) and for being unavailable to 
disadvantaged groups, those of low socioeconomic status and users from emerging 
regions (Thebault-Spieker et al., 2015). 
 
DLTs address some of these criticisms by decentralising and disintermediating. 
Embedding sensors into existing assets, our ‘things’ can collect and share data. By 
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integrating these data into the blockchain, we can keep an immutable ledger of shared 
transactions without the need for middlemen (Huckle et al., 2016). La’Zooz13 is a 
decentralized transportation platform owned by the community and utilising vehicles’ 
unused space, enabling people with private cars to share their drive with others 
travelling the same route: a decentralized Uber. 
 
La’Zooz generates new tokens from ‘Proof of Movement’ not ‘Proof of Work.' As they 
drive, drivers earn Zooz, passengers pay using Zooz and can also earn Zooz by 
providing route advice to drivers.  La’Zooz offers to provide a ride-sharing service that 
is based on truer sharing economy principles, rather than monetary incentives 
(Bheemaiah, 2015). The business model moves from rent extraction to value creation in 
networks: value is distributed amongst those who created it, offering a greater reward 
and opportunity for inclusion. 
 
Financial inclusion 
The opportunity for wider financial inclusion is held up as one of the great promises for 
SDGs of DLTs. Through automation, disintermediation, low cost and security of 
transfer comes the opportunity for transactions involving low-value units and for 
remote, disenfranchised, peripheral and marginal communities to connect in new ways 
either amongst themselves or with activities in the wider world. DLTs allow the almost 
instantaneous transfer of digital tokens, if not at zero cost then at a significantly cheaper 
rate than established services. This makes the transfer of small amounts of currency 
economically viable, enabling new actors to enter the field and new opportunities for e-
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commerce (Athey, 2015). It might be anticipated, then, that reductions in the cost of 
financial transactions through DLTs will result in widening financial inclusion. 
 
One critical factor in enabling greater financial inclusion is identity which, it is argued 
(Birch, 2014) will underpin future digital transactions and lies at the heart of realising 
the potential of DLT. The question of what defines identity is challenging, not least 
because it ‘does not lend itself easily to definition nor does it remain unchangeable’ 
(Ajana, 2010, p.5).  Identities are made up of multiple attributes: date and place of birth, 
parents’ names, school, criminal record, employment record, biometrics, papers 
published, etc. These attributes reflect who we are and are configurable depending on 
whom we need to identify ourselves to and for what purpose.  
 
For most, it is relatively straightforward to assemble authenticated attributes of identity 
(passport, utility bill, etc.), but approximately 1.8bn of the world’s population have no 
legally recognised identity (Dahan and Gelb, 2015). The reasons are various, but the 
consequence is that the ‘identityless’ exist on the margins of society unable formally to 
participate in democratic, educative, healthcare and economic activity.  
 
Part of the problem of identitylessness is the extent to which identity has been a 
centralised phenomenon, something that, to a large extent, is given to people by some 
authority. The affordances of DLTs offer an alternative approach to building identities 
from the bottom up, as the gradual accretion of different attributes of identity. This way, 
an individual’s identity is not under the control or the gift of any central authority, nor is 
it vulnerable to tampering or theft from malicious third parties. Further, individuals are 
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able to control which attributes may/may not be made public depending on the 
authentication need. This is currently an area of intense DLT development including 
initiatives from ID2020
14
, BitNation
15
, BlockchainBorderBank
16
, BanQu
17
, and 
NevTrace
18
.  
 
Conclusion 
In 2013 Nobel Prize-winning economist, Paul Krugman declared that ‘Bitcoin is evil.’ 
Others, too, have been critical (Lemieux, 2013; Doguet, 2013; Fox-Brewster, 2015; 
Welch, 2015; Böhme et al., 2015). Despite these criticisms, DLTs have also been 
heralded as an incremental innovation with the potential for inducing efficiency gains 
and ethically empowering business, or disruptive innovations (triggering the emergence 
of new economic systems), that may prove to be more socially and environmentally 
responsible (Swan, 2015; Davidson et al., 2016; Walport, 2016).     
 
This paper has explored, through affordance theory, how DLTs might contribute to the 
sustainability agenda. On the face of it, the potential appears significant. DLTs provide 
a technical basis for a degree of change that many observers have found exciting. The 
way we relate to DLTs is not merely a technical matter but strongly relates to the ways 
in which we configure our social world (Reijers and Coeckelbergh, 2016). 
Consequently, we propose the notion of Blockchain for Good as an emergent 
phenomenon or shared interpretative schema that is being co-constructed by a wide 
ecosystem of actors as a means of giving direction and catalyzing actions, choices, and 
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16
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17
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18
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behaviours (Ranson et al., 1980). Crucially, this approach unlocks the potential for 
more detailed examinations of the moral and ethical impetus behind blockchain 
projects.  
 
Within this limited space, we have presented a rather one-sided perspective and are 
aware that DLTs are not a universal panacea. The notion of Blockchain for Good 
inevitably raises questions about its counter, ‘Blockchain for Bad’ and there exists, 
beyond the scope of this paper, a body of cautionary literature. Analysing crypto-
currencies through the lens of ethical impact, Dierksmeier and Seele (2016) also find 
detrimental outcomes, such as the facilitation of nefarious consumption. Physicist 
Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and, as of 12 November 2016, 8,749 others have signed 
an open letter counselling against the incautious application of artificial intelligence and 
DAOs (Russell et al., 2015). DLTs feel no guilt, regret or remorse. This raises questions 
about who will do the coding. As yet, there is little regulation specific to DLT. Still, 
might DLTs yet be subsumed by incumbent organizations and authorities as another 
tool of control and surveillance, or can they really deliver a more democratic, 
egalitarian, collaborative and sustainable society? 
 
DLTs are still at an early stage of development, and it remains unclear in which 
direction they will go. The essential premise of technology affordance is that to 
understand the uses and consequences of technologies, they must be considered in the 
context of their dynamic interactions between people and organizations (Majchrzak and 
Markus, 2012), DLTs are a case-in-point. Dozens of crypto-currencies now exist, each 
optimized for different purposes, each idiosyncratic in terms of its operation, uptake, 
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exchange rate and convertibility. Similarly, others are exploring DLT applications that 
are not currency-oriented. Given this variety, further research is required to understand 
which type works best in which circumstances and why, as well as the extent to which 
they can deliver on the sustainability agenda. 
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